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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to improve the accuracy of port-scan detec-
tors by analyzing traffic of BitTorrent hosts and differentiat-
ing their respective BitTorrent connection (attempts) from
port-scans. It is shown that by looking at BitTorrent co-
ordination traffic and modelling port-scanning behavior the
number of BitTorrent-related false positives can be reduced
by 80% without any loss of IDS accuracy.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Goal
Many internet attacks begin by scanning a number of ad-
dresses with the goal of finding an open port. This phe-
nomenon is called “port-scanning”. Detecting a port-scan
allows network administrators to identify an attack early
enough to take protective measures for reducing or eliminat-
ing the ensuing damage. Detection methods for port-scans
account for the fact that an attacker probes a large number
of hosts in a considerably short span of time.
Another form of traffic which exhibits behavior similar to
port-scans is peer-to-peer communication. In many P2P ap-
plications a host tries to initiate connections to a large num-
ber of peers. However, the presence of NATs and firewalls
makes a significant number of these peers difficult or impos-
sible to reach. This results in a number of failed handshake
attempts which resemble port-scanning attempts. The ab-
sence of payload information in such connections also makes
it impossible to use deep-packet inspection (DPI) for traffic
labeling.
The false-positives triggered by P2P traffic in port-scan
detectors makes it harder for security researchers and net-
work administrators to profile network attacks. Similarly
the inadequacy of DPI on failed handshakes reduces the ef-
fectiveness of network classification tools. To address these
issues, this project inspects BitTorrent communication orig-
inating from a peer in order to predict its connection at-
tempts to other peers. Consequently, those handshake fail-
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
Copyright 20XX ACM X-XXXXX-XX-X/XX/XX ...$15.00.
ures which can be confidently labeled as P2P traffic are pre-
vented from influencing results of port-scan detectors.
In addition to predicting the BitTorrent connections, this
project models the behavior of port-scanners in order to find
the port/peer ratio which can help differentiating between
scan attempts and P2P traffic.
By using these features the goals of reducing port-scanning
false-positives and enhancing traffic classification accuracy
are achieved. The Bro IDS is used for developing and test-
ing the traffic analyzer and the statistics for improvement
are based upon its default scan detector.
1.2 Problem
1.2.1 Port-scanning
Many cyber attacks need to identify potential victims be-
fore exploiting their weaknesses. A popular method for dis-
covering tractable hosts is port-scanning. It can be defined
as probing several ports on a number of machines in order to
find susceptible hosts. Some of the probes fail, some of them
succeed but do not find any vulnerable service while some
of them land at a port hosting a service which is further
exploited by the attacker.
Detecting port scans provides network administrators the
ability to take pre-emptive measures against an attack by
identifying the attacker. Scan detectors look for N events
of interest across a T -sized time window [9].
The first such algorithm in literature was that of Network
Security Monitor (NSM) [5]. It flagged those hosts as mali-
cious which contacted more than fifteen distinct destination
IP addresses within a specified time-window.
The Snort IDS [12] uses two different pre-processors for
scan detection. The first is packet-oriented. It detects mal-
formed packets such as those used for stealth-scanning by
nmap. The second method is connection-oriented and is
similar to the NSM algorithm. It triggers alarm if a source
IP address contacts X number of ports across Y number of
IP addresses in Z seconds.
The Bro IDS [11] builds on the observation that scanners
do not have extensive knowledge of the network topology
and system configuration. Therefore, it uses failed connec-
tion attempts as indicators of port-scans. For traffic using
one of the services specified in a configurable list, Bro pop-
ulates its port-scan metrics only if the connection attempts
fail. For all other traffic it keeps track of all connections
regardless of their establishment. When the number of dis-
tinct destination addresses crosses a particular threshold N
an alarm is triggered.
All of these methods face a number of difficulties in effec-
Figure 1: A typical port scan
tive port-scan detection. Temporal as well as spatial con-
siderations impose limitations in the amount of connections
that are tracked. With the explosive growth of Internet
many legitimate user activities also resemble behavior simi-
lar to port-scans. For example, it is not uncommon for web
users to initiate connections to dozens of different websites
at once. While such usage is catered for by Bro’s strategy
of tracking only failed connections, an issue remains in the
case of P2P traffic.
P2P clients generally contact a large number of hosts in
a short span of time and unlike other well-known services
use arbitrary ports for their communication [6]. This makes
their behavior not only similar to port-scans but also harder
to classify than other well-known services without the help of
deep-packet inspection. An example of the Bro scan detector
raising false alarm is shown below:
$ bro -r bittorrent.pcap scan.bro
1317250200.756488 AddressScan 192.168.0.5 has scanned
20 hosts(32833/tcp)
1317250222.395888 ShutdownThresh shutdown threshold reached
for 192.168.0.5
1317250222.425419 AddressScan 192.168.0.5 has scanned
101 hosts (45612/tcp)
1317250288.527706 ScanSummary 192.168.0.5 scanned
a total of 326 hosts
1317250288.527706 PortScanSummary 192.168.0.5 scanned
a total of 224 ports
1.2.2 P2P Handshake Failures
Network Address Translator (NAT) are devices that allow
multiple hosts on a private network to communicate with the
Internet using a single public IP. This is achieved by modify-
ing network layer information on-the-fly. When an internal
host initiates a connection to an outsider a dynamic map-
ping is created which allows the response to be forwarded
to that particular host as shown in Figure 2. Unsolicited in-
bound connections are dropped since NAT simply does not
know which internal host should receive the data. Figure 3
Figure 2: Outbound NAT connections
shows a NAT box receiving incoming data but does not know
which internal client [A,D] should the data be forwarded to.
Firewalls are devices which inspect traffic passing through
them and filter it based on a set of rules. In basic implemen-
tations unsolicited inbound connections are rejected while
outbound connections are allowed.
Hosts which are behind NAT and/or firewalls have re-
stricted connectivity in terms of receiving inbound connec-
tions. In P2P terminology they are called unconnectable
peers. The ratio of such peers is considerably high, ranging
from 60% to 90% of all P2P users [2, 3].
When a P2P client needs to contact other peers it uses
a number of methods to obtain a list of their addresses.
The most primitive of these methods is to contact a central
tracker and request peer lists. Other de-centralized methods
such as distributed hash tables also exist for storing peer
lists.
However, in popular protocols such as BitTorrent the peer
lists returned to a client via these methods usually contains
information about other peers regardless of their connectiv-
ity status. As a result, unconnectable peers are often present
in these lists.
Unconnectable peers result in a large number of failed con-
nection attempts which can negatively influence the false-
positive rate of scan detectors such as Bro. The similarity
of connectivity behavior of P2P hosts and a scanner is shown
in Figure 4
1.3 Solution
1.3.1 BitTorrent Communication Analysis
BitTorrent is the most popular P2P file-sharing protocol,
Figure 3: Inbound NAT connections
accounting for more than half of all P2P file sharing traffic
[10]. Files shared via BitTorrent are divided into equal-sized
chunks. Peers download these pieces from each other while
uploading them simultaneously to other peers as well. All
the peers which are sharing a particular file at a time are
collectively called a swarm.
Before peers start to download a file however, they need to
coordinate first in order to locate each other. The BitTorrent
coordination lines in Figure 5 take place before the actual
traffic and hence can be used to predict the successful and
failed connections originating from a peer.
The earliest method for BitTorrent coordination was via
centralized trackers. Centralized trackers keep track of which
peers are downloading a file. When a new peer wants to
join the swarm it requests a peer list from the tracker. The
tracker responds with a list of k randomly picked peers, con-
taining both connectable and unconnectable hosts. Con-
nection attempts to unconnectable hosts then subsequently
results in failed TCP connections [8].
In order to alleviate the load on trackers as well as increase
resilience against take-down attempts two de-centralized meth-
ods exist for obtaining peer lists: Distributed Hash Table
(DHT) and Peer Exchange (PEX).
A DHT is a distributed database overlayed over a network
of computers called nodes. All nodes can store (key, value)
pairs on the DHT and search for values via key-lookups. In
order to join a DHT a peer has to first contact a bootstrap
node in that DHT. Currently, the BitTorrent community
uses two major DHTs: the Azureus DHT and the Main-
line DHT. The Azureus DHT is in use only by the Azureus
clients while the Mainline DHT is used by other clients such
as µTorrent, BitComent and Mainline. Both DHTs are im-
plementations of the Kademlia protocol [1].
The second de-centralized method of peer discovery is
PEX. In PEX peers “gossip” with each other in regular in-
Figure 4: Connections of a P2P host and a port
scanner
tervals about the list of active peers they know about [13].
There is no official specification for the peer exchange proto-
col in BitTorrent. The de facto standard for Peer Exchange
is µTorrent PEX.
All these methods of peer discovery can be interpreted by
a traffic analyzer, with the exception of trackers that serve
on HTTPS. By reading the peer lists returned via HTTP
tracker, DHT or PEX it is possible to “predict” the BitTor-
rent connection attempts that are going to originate from
a given source IP. This shall in turn make it possible to la-
bel failed connection attempts and differentiate them from
port-scans.
2. IMPLEMENTATION
2.1 Bro IDS
The Bro IDS was used to develop and test the traffic
analyze along with its scan detector for providing baseline
statistics. During the course of development Bro’s core was
modified to provide the following helper functions:
• Listing 1: raw_ns_bytes_to_uint16
Interpret the first two bytes of a string as a 2-byte
unsigned integer in network-byte order.
• Listing 2: raw_nl_bytes_to_uint32
Interpret the first four bytes of a string as a 4-byte
unsigned integer in network-byte order.
• Listing 3: sub_bytes_sane
Bro’s default sub_bytes function had the idiosyncratic
behavior in that it if the indices were greater than
Figure 5: BitTorrent coordination
Figure 6: Various methods for BitTorrent coordina-
tion
0 it decremented them by 1 before slicing the string.
This function works around this behavior by retaining
uniformity of indices.
• Listing 4: raw_byte
Returns the raw byte at a particular index in a string
as an unsigned integer.
• Listing 5: raw_bytes
Returns the raw bytes in a string as a vector of un-
signed integers.
2.2 Central Trackers
A central tracker keeps track of peers that are currently
downloading a file and transfers this list to new peers that
are trying to join the swarm.
There are two types of central tracker used by BitTorrent
clients.
2.2.1 HTTP Tracker
A built-in analyzer was available in Bro for the HTTP
tracker communication. However, using the peer lists ex-
tracted from this analyzer did not yield any connection hits.
Therefore we manually analyzed the contents of TCP pack-
Figure 7: Central tracker
ets to extract peer lists whenever a specific regular expres-
sion is matched in the packet. This regular expression con-
firms the presence of peer list in the benc format that used
by BitTorrent.
Any peers that are found in the peer lists are added to a
global peer_mappings table which is indexed by source IPs
and yields the (IP, Port) tuple for targets extracted from the
peer list.
For example, if client X gets a peer list in which a peer
A is listed as listening on port 6668, (A, 6668) is added as a
possible target for X.
Listing 6 shows the code used by the HTTP analyzer to
process each TCP packet.
2.2.2 UDP Tracker
The BitTorrent ecosystem is moving on to UDP track-
ers because of less overhead compared to HTTP trackers.
Many major tracker websites such as The Pirate Bay and
Mininova have already switched to UDP trackers. Bro did
not have a built-in analyzer for the UDP tracker commu-
nication so we analyzed UDP traffic for packets of particu-
lar lengths and matched the action fields of the packet for
annount_response. Once the UDP tracker communication
was identified, announce_response helper function is called
which in turn extracts the peer list and stores it in a global
peer_mapping table.
Listing 7 shows the processing of each UDP packet by the
UDP tracker analyzer.
2.3 Distributed Hash Tables
2.3.1 Azureus DHT
Table 3 and Table 4 show the packet structures for head-
ers of ADHT packets. ADHT requests start with a random
connection ID and do not have a fixed length. To identify
these requests, the 16th byte of each UDP packet is checked
for a valid ADHT protocol version. Based on the found pro-
tocol version, various offsets are added to a running counter
corresponding to different fields.
Eventually, the originating port of the packet should ap-
pear in network-byte order at a specific offset. If that check
does succeed, the packet is a valid ADHT request and bytes
[8, 12] are checked for ACTION field of the request.
Upon finding a valid ACTION, either a helper find_*_request
function is called which in turn extract the TRANSACTION_ID
and store it in a global table.
Similarly, all packets are checked for valid TRANSACTION_IDs
from requests that have already been seen. If one is found,
a helper find_*_response function is called which extracts
the peer list out of the DHT values.
Figure 8: Peer Exchange
Listing 8 shows the code used by the ADHT analyzer to
process each UDP packet.
2.3.2 Mainline DHT
For extracting Mainline DHT peer lists regular expres-
sions are matched inside UDP packets for“nodes”and“values”
responses. Upon matching the regular expressions the num-
ber of peers is determined and then each peer’s IP address
and port number is extracted in a sequential manner. List-
ing 9 shows the code used by the MDHT analyzer to extract
peers out of DHT respones.
2.3.3 Other DHTs
During the course of development we observed that certain
UDP traffic flows between BitTorrent hosts before they ini-
tiate TCP connections. Matching this UDP traffic allows us
to predict the TCP connections since the destination port
remains same on both transport layer protocols. The sig-
natures for matching miscellaneous DHT traffic were taken
from libprotoident’s database, which is an open-source li-
brary for detecting application layer protocols from length
of a payload combined with its first four bytes.
Listing 10 shows the code used by BTUDP analyzer to
match signatures across each UDP packet. Once a BTUDP
packet is detected, the target IP and port are added to safe
peer_mappings.
2.4 Peer Exchange
Compatible BitTorrent clients “gossip” with each other
about the clients they know exist in their swarm. This form
of coordination is called Peer Exchange and is shown in Fig-
ure 8.
2.4.1 UTPEX
µTorrent PEX or UTPEX is the de facto standard of Peer
Exchange for BitTorrent clients. The packets are searched
for regular expressions matching “added” responses which
are sent by a client to its peers existing when it learns about
new clients in the swarm. Listing 11 shows the code used
by UTPEX analyzer for processing each TCP packet.
2.5 Port/Peer Ratio
Port/Peer Ratio is a feature which relies on behavioral dif-
ferences between port scanners and BitTorrent downloaders.
Before explaining these differences it is important to outline
various categories in which a scanner’s behavior can be clas-
sified.
There are three kinds of port scans [7]. The first scan type
is “horizontal” in which the attacker probes multiple hosts
on the same port as shown in Figure 9. The motiviation for
such a scan stems from the fact that a known vulnerability
would exist on that port.
Figure 9: A horizontal scan
Figure 10: A vertical scan
The second scan type is “vertical” in which the attack
probes a single host for multiple ports as shown in Figure 10.
The motivation for such a scan lies in attacker targetting a
specific victim to find any vulnerability he can find.
A hybrid or block scan is a combination of both horizontal
and vertical scans and is shown in Figure 11.
In contrast, a P2P host contacts a large number of hosts on
ports that are fairly random and almost unique since most of
the hosts are behind NAT and have set up port-forwarding
on non-standard ports. This is shown in Figure 12
To use these observations, Port/Peer Ratio PPR of each
host is kept track of. Ports correspond to unique ports while
peers correspond to number of unique IP addresses that a
hose has probed. From the discussion above:
• If PPR is close to 0, it indicates a horizontal scan.
• If PPR is close to 1, it indicates P2P behavior.
• If PPR is greater than 1, it indicates a vertical or
hybrid scan.
Listing 12 shows code modifications to Bro’s scan detector
for suppressing alarms when PPR of the attacker lies be-
tween a lower and upper threshold. By default these thresh-
olds are specified as 0.75 and 1 respectively.
3. RESULTS
Figure 11: A hybrid scan
Figure 12: Port connectivity behavior of a P2P
client
3.1 Controlled Experiment
For this experiment labeled data sets containing port scan-
ners and BitTorrent hosts were used to gauge the IDS per-
formance. With support of Dr. Ali Khayam we were able to
obtain traces for 41 TCP port scanners which were gener-
ated at various rates for the RAID ’10 paper [4] on impact
of P2P on anomaly detection. In addition to the RAID
data sets, nmap was used to generate traffic for 10 further
scanners. The combined traces had 51 port scanners which
scanned at rates varying from 0.01/s to 1000/s.
In order to process P2P traffic, BitTorrent traces were
generated on 49 different virtual hosts. Various BitTor-
rent clients including Azureus, BitComet, Deluge, µTorrent,
Transmission and FlashGet were used to generate the traf-
fic on both Windows and Linux platforms. For each client
application the default settings were used which resulted in
unencrypted traffic for all hosts. It was ensured that the
hosts were not infected at the time of traffic generation.
The traffic for both the scanners and BitTorrent hosts
were aligned temporally to start at the same time while IP
addresses were rewritten to avoid spatial collisions. The IP
addresses were reassigned according to the criterion which
assigned BitTorrent hosts and port scanners separate net-
works for ease of labeling.
To compare the performance of scan detector and its im-
provements ROC curves were used. The results are shown in
Figure 13. Each point on the graph shows different thresh-
olds for the number of addresses a host can probe within the
15 minute time window before being flagged as a scanner. At
more relaxed thresholds, e.g., 1000, the points concentrated
in the lower-left corner of the graph. Similarly, at stricter
thresholds, e.g., 5, the points moved towards the upper-right
corner of the graph as more scanners and BitTorrent hosts
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Figure 13: ROC curves for port scanner perfor-
mance
were flagged.
Conclusion
The original Bro scanner had a curve which bent signifi-
cantly towards the lower-right corner of the graph. Adding
the BitTorrent analyzer engine improved the performance of
scan detector significantly without any loss of IDS accuracy
since the curves do not intersect at any threshold. At the
default Bro threshold, i.e., 100, the false positive rate is de-
creased from 44
49
= 89% to 1
49
= 2%. By using the Port/Peer
Ratio feature, the false positive rate is further improved to
0
49
= 0%.
3.2 Live Traffic
For live traffic experiments a 400 GB trace was used which
was captured at a Nayatel B-RAS over a duration of 24
hours.
We first ran BitTorrent Analyzer to figure out which con-
nections could have been “predicted” by looking at the Bit-
Torrent coordination traffic. Then we calculated the du-
ration each BitTorrent host took to contact 100 predicted
connections before being flagged as a scanner. So if host
A was flagged as a scanner at 9:05 AM and 100 predicted
BitTorrent connections originated from A between 9:00 and
9:05 AM the duration would be 5 minutes. A histogram was
generated with each bin denoting 15 minutes of time. As
shown in Figure 14 most of the BitTorrent hosts generated
100 predicted BitTorrent connections in the first 15 minutes
bin before being flagged as a scanner. The results indicate a
strong influence of predicted BitTorrent connections on the
scan flags.
Bro originally detected 202 scanners in the 400 GB trace.
By filtering connections through the BitTorrent Analyzer
the number of alarms was reduced to 32 as 170 flags were
suppressed. We manually analyzed the remaining 32 hosts
to observe that 26 of them were actual scanners while 6,
or 3% of the original flags, were false alarms that were still
being raised. These results are summarized in the pie-chart
shown in Figure 15.
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Conclusion
We concluded that almost all BitTorrent hosts generate false
alarms because of their aggressive connectivity behavior.
The BitTorrent Analyzer was able to reduce the number
of false alarms significantly, however about 3% of the total
flags still generated false positives.
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APPENDIX
A. BRO MODIFICATIONS
1 f un c t i on raw ns by t e s t o u in t16%(b : s t r i ng%) :
count
%{
3 u int32 u = 0 ;
5 i f ( b−>Len ( ) < 2 )
b u i l t i n e r r o r ( ” too short a s t r i n g as input to
raw byte s t o u in t16 ( ) ”) ;
7
e l s e
9 {
const u char∗ bp = b−>Bytes ( ) ;
11 u = (bp [ 0 ] << 8) | bp [ 1 ] ;
}
13
re turn new Val (u , TYPE COUNT) ;
15 %}
Listing 1: raw_ns_bytes_to_uint16 helper function for
Bro
1 f un c t i on r aw n l b y t e s t o u in t 3 2%(b : s t r i n g%) :
count
%{
3 u int32 u = 0 ;
5 i f ( b−>Len ( ) < 4 )
b u i l t i n e r r o r ( ” too short a s t r i n g as input to
raw byte s t o u in t32 ( ) ”) ;
7
e l s e
9 {
const u char∗ bp = b−>Bytes ( ) ;
11 u = (bp [ 0 ] << 24) | (bp [ 1 ] << 16) | (bp [ 2 ] <<
8) | bp [ 3 ] ;
}
13
re turn new Val (u , TYPE COUNT) ;
15 %}
Listing 2: raw_nl_bytes_to_uint32 helper function for
Bro
1 f un c t i on sub byt e s sane%(s : s t r i n g , s t a r t : count ,
n : i n t%) : s t r i n g
%{
3 BroStr ing ∗ s s = s−>AsString ( )−>GetSubstr ing (
s t a r t , n ) ;
5 i f ( ! s s )
s s = new BroStr ing ( ””) ;
7
re turn new Str ingVal ( s s ) ;
9 %}
Listing 3: sub_bytes_sane helper function for Bro
1 f un c t i on raw byte%(s : s t r i n g , index : count%) :
count
%{
3 re turn new Val ( s−>Bytes ( ) [ index ] , TYPE COUNT) ;
%}
Listing 4: raw_byte helper function for Bro
f un c t i on raw bytes%(s : s t r i n g%) : index vec
2 %{
VectorVal ∗ r e s u l t v =
4 new VectorVal (new VectorType ( base type (
TYPE COUNT) ) ) ;
6 i n t i ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < s−>Len ( ) ; ++i )
8 {
r e s u l t v−>Assign ( i , new Val ( s−>Bytes ( ) [ i ] ,
TYPE COUNT) , 0) ;
10 }
12 re turn r e s u l t v ;
%}
Listing 5: raw_bytes helper function for Bro
A.1 HTTP Tracker
1 event t cp con te n t s ( c : connection , i s o r i g : bool , seq :
count , contents : s t r i ng )
{
3 f o r ( s in f i n d a l l ( contents , /5\ : pee rs [0−9]+\ :/) )
{
5 l o c a l sv : s t r i n g v e c = s t r s p l i t ( s , ve ctor (7 ) ) ;
l o c a l l en : count = to count ( sub byt e s sane ( sv [ 2 ] , 0 ,
by t e l e n ( sv [ 2 ] ) − 1) ) ;
7
l o c a l i : count = 0 ;
9 l o c a l peers compact : s t r i ng = sub byte s sane ( contents ,
s t r s t r ( contents , s ) + by te l e n ( s ) − 1 , l en ) ;
f o r ( dummy in peers compact )
11 {
Offset Size Name
0 32-bit integer action
4 32-bit integer transaction_id
8 32-bit integer interval
12 32-bit integer leechers
16 32-bit integer seeders
20 + 6 × n 32-bit integer IP address
24 + 6 × n 16-bit integer TCP port
Table 1: Packet structure for a UDP tracker an-
nounce_response containing n peers
i f ( i % 6 == 0 )
13 {
l o c a l peer compact : s t r i n g = sub by te s s ane (
peers compact , i − 6 , 6) ;
15 l o c a l peer : TrackerPeer ;
17 peer$h = raw byt e s t o v4 addr ( peer compact ) ;
peer$p = raw ns by te s t o u i n t 16 ( sub byt e s sane (
peer compact , 4 , 2) ) ;
19
l o c a l o r i g : addr = ( i s o r i g ? c$ i d$ r e sp h :
c$ i d$ o r i g h ) ;
21
i f ( o r i g ! in peer mappings )
23 {
peer mappings [ o r i g ] = se t ( ) ;
25 }
add peer mappings [ o r i g ] [ peer ] ;
27 }
29 i = i + 1 ;
}
31 }
}
Listing 6: tcp_contents event handler for HTTP
analyzer
A.2 UDP Tracker
A.2.1 Packet structure
The following information was retrieved from BitTorrent
Enhancement Proposal 15 1.
A.2.2 Code
event udp contents (u : connection , i s o r i g : bool , content s :
s t r i n g )
2 {
l o c a l l en : count = by t e l e n ( content s ) ;
4
i f ( ( l en − 20 ) % 6 != 0 )
6 {
return ;
8 }
10 i f ( s ub by te s s ane ( contents , 0 , 4) != ”\x00\x00\x00\01”
)
{
12 return ;
}
14
announce response (u , i s o r i g , contents ) ;
16 }
Listing 7: udp_contents event handler for UDP
Tracker analyzer
A.3 Azureus DHT
A.3.1 Packet structures
The following information was retrieved from the Vuze
Wiki 2.
A.3.2 Code
event udp contents (u : connection , i s o r i g : bool , content s :
s t r i n g )
2 {
1http://bittorrent.org/beps/bep 0015.html
2http://wiki.vuze.com/w/Distributed hash table
Name Width Note
byte 1 byte Single byte
short 2 bytes Big endian
int 4 bytes Big endian
long 8 bytes Big endian
boolean 1 byte False = 0; True = 1
address 7 bytes or 19 bytes First byte indicates length of the IP address (4 for IPv4, 16 for IPv6); next comes the address in network byte order; the last value
is port number as short
contact 9 bytes or 21 bytes First byte indicates contact type, which must be UDP (1); second byte indicates the contact’s protocol version; the rest is an address
Table 2: Serialization for ADHT values
Name Type Protocol Version Note
CONNECTION_ID long always Random number with most significant bit set to 1
ACTION int always Type of the packet
TRANSACTION_ID int always Unique number used through the communication; it is randomly generated at the start of the application and
increased by 1 with each sent packet
PROTOCOL_VERSION byte always Version of protocol used in this packet
VENDOR_ID byte ≥VENDOR_ID ID of the DHT implementator; 0 = Azureus, 1 = ShareNet, 255 = unknown
NETWORK_ID int ≥NETWORKS ID of the network; 0 = stable version; 1 = CVS version
LOCAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION byte ≥FIX_ORIGINATOR Maximum protocol version this node supports; if this packet’s protocol version is <FIX ORIGINATOR then
the value is stored at the end of the packet
NODE_ADDRESS address always Address of the local node
INSTANCE_ID int always Application’s helper number; randomly generated at the start
TIME long always Time of the local node; stored as number of milliseconds since Epoch
Table 3: Header for ADHT requests
l o c a l p r o t o c o l v e r s i o n : count ;
4 l o c a l ac t i on : s t r i ng ;
6 p r o t o c o l v e r s i o n = raw byte ( contents , 16) ;
i f ( p r o t o c o l v e r s i o n in v a l i d p r o t o c o l v e r s i o n s )
8 {
l o c a l o f f s e t : count = 17 ;
10 i f ( p r o t o c o l v e r s i o n >= pro t o c o l v e r s i o n s [ ”VENDOR ID
”] )
{
12 o f f s e t += 1 ;
}
14 i f ( p r o t o c o l v e r s i o n >= pro t o c o l v e r s i o n s [ ”NETWORKS”]
)
{
16 o f f s e t += 1 ;
}
18 i f ( p r o t o c o l v e r s i o n >= pro t o c o l v e r s i o n s [ ”
FIX ORIGINATOR”] )
{
20 o f f s e t += 4 ;
}
22
o f f s e t += 5;
24
l o c a l p : count ;
26 p = raw n s b y t e s t o u i n t 1 6 ( s ub byt e s sa ne ( contents ,
o f f s e t , 2) ) ;
i f ( p == po r t to c ount ( u$ i d$o r i g p ) )
28 {
act ion = sub byte s sane ( contents , 8 , 4) ;
30
i f ( ac t i on == ”\x00\x00\x04\x04 ” )
32 {
f i n d n ode r eq ue s t (u , i s o r i g , contents ) ;
34 }
i f ( ac t i on == ”\x00\x00\x04\x06 ” )
36 {
f i n d va l u e r e qu e s t (u , i s o r i g , content s ) ;
38 }
}
40 }
42 i f ( s ub by te s s ane ( contents , 4 , 4) in t r a n s a c t i o n i d s )
{
44 l o c a l a : DhtAction = t r a n s a c t i o n i d s [ s ub byt e s sa ne (
contents , 4 , 4) ] ;
46 act i on = sub byt e s sane ( contents , 0 , 4) ;
48 i f ( a == FindNode && act ion == ”\x00\x00\x04\x05 ” )
{
50 f i nd n ode re spon s e (u , i s o r i g , contents ) ;
}
52 i f ( a == FindValue && act ion == ”\x00\x00\x04\x07 ” )
{
54 f i nd v a l u e r e s p on s e (u , i s o r i g , contents ) ;
}
56 }
}
Listing 8: udp_contents event handler for ADHT
analyzer
A.4 Mainline DHT
1 func t ion pa r s e v a lu e s (u : connection , i s o r i g : bool ,
c ontent s : s t r i n g )
{
3 f o r ( s in f i n d a l l ( contents , /6\ : v a l u e s l 6 \ : / ) )
{
5 l o c a l o f f s e t : count = s t r s t r ( contents , s ) + 8 ;
7 f o r ( c in contents )
{
9 i f ( sub byt e s sane ( contents , o f f s e t , 2) != ”6 : ” )
{
11 break ;
}
13 o f f s e t += 2 ;
15 l o c a l peer compact : s t r i n g = sub by te s s ane ( contents
, o f f s e t , 6) ;
l o c a l peer : DhtPeer ;
17
peer$h = raw byt e s to v4 addr ( peer compact ) ;
19 peer$p = raw n s b y t e s t o u i n t 1 6 ( s ub byt e s s ane (
peer compact , 4 , 2) ) ;
21 i f ( u$ id$o r ig h ! in peer mappings )
{
23 peer mappings [ u$ id$o r ig h ] = s e t ( ) ;
}
25 add peer mappings [ u$ id$o r i g h ] [ peer ] ;
27 o f f s e t += 6 ;
i f ( o f f s e t > by t e l en ( con tent s ) )
29 {
break ;
31 }
}
33 }
}
Listing 9: mdht_find_values helper function for
MDHT analyzer
A.5 Other DHTs
event udp contents (u : connection , i s o r i g : bool , content s :
s t r i n g )
2 {
l o c a l matched : bool = F;
4 l o c a l msb4 : s t r i ng = sub by te s sane ( contents , 0 , 4) ;
l o c a l l en : count = by t e l e n ( content s ) ;
6
i f ( msb4 == /d1 : [ areqt ]/ )
8 {
matched = T;
10 }
12 i f ( msb4 == /d1 . : / )
{
14 matched = T;
}
16
# other checks f o r s i gna tu re matching ommitted f o r
b rev i ty . . .
18
i f ( ! matched )
20 {
return ;
22 }
24 l o c a l peer : BTUDPPeer;
l o c a l o r i g : addr ;
Name Type Protocol Version Note
ACTION int always Type of the packet
TRANSACTION_ID int always Must be equal to TRANSACTION_ID from the request
CONNECTION_ID long always Must be equal to CONNECTION_ID from the request
PROTOCOL_VERSION byte always Version of protocol used in this packet
VENDOR_ID byte ≥VENDOR_ID Same meaning as in the request
NETWORK_ID int ≥NETWORKS Same meaning as in the request
INSTANCE_ID int always Instance id of the node that replies to the request
Table 4: Header for ADHT replies
26
i f ( i s o r i g )
28 {
o r ig = u$ i d$o r i g h ;
30 peer$h = u$id$re sp h ;
peer$p = po r t to count ( u$ id$ resp p ) ;
32 }
e l s e
34 {
o r ig = u$ id$ re sp h ;
36 peer$h = u$ id$o r ig h ;
peer$p = po r t to count ( u$ i d$o r i g p ) ;
38 }
40 i f ( o r i g ! in peer mappings )
{
42 peer mappings [ o r i g ] = s e t ( ) ;
}
44 add peer mappings [ o r i g ] [ peer ] ;
}
Listing 10: udp_contents helper function for BTUDP
analyzer
A.6 UTPEX
event t cp con te n t s ( c : connection , i s o r i g : bool , seq :
count , contents : s t r i ng )
2 {
f o r ( s in f i n d a l l ( contents , /5\ : added [0−9]+\ :/) )
4 {
l o c a l sv : s t r i n g v e c = s t r s p l i t ( s , ve ctor (7 ) ) ;
6 l o c a l l en : count = to count ( sub byt e s sane ( sv [ 2 ] , 0 ,
by t e l e n ( sv [ 2 ] ) − 1) ) ;
8 l o c a l i : count = 0 ;
l o c a l peers compact : s t r i ng = sub byte s sane ( contents ,
s t r s t r ( contents , s ) + by te l e n ( s ) − 1 , l en ) ;
10 f o r ( dummy in peers compact )
{
12 i f ( i % 6 == 0 )
{
14 l o c a l peer compact : s t r i n g = sub by te s s ane (
peers compact , i − 6 , 6) ;
l o c a l peer : PexPeer ;
16
peer$h = raw by te s to v4 addr ( peer compact ) ;
18 peer$p = raw n s b y t e s t o u i n t 1 6 ( s ub byt e s s ane (
peer compact , 4 , 2) ) ;
20 l o c a l o r i g : addr = ( i s o r i g ? c$ i d$ r e sp h :
c $ i d $o r i g h ) ;
22 i f ( o r i g ! in peer mappings )
{
24 peer mappings [ o r i g ] = se t ( ) ;
}
26 add peer mappings [ o r i g ] [ peer ] ;
}
28
i = i + 1;
30 }
}
32 }
Listing 11: tcp_contents event handler for UTPEX
analyzer
A.7 Port/Peer Ratio
f unc t ion check scan ( c : connection , e s ta b l i s h ed : bool ,
r ev e r se : bool ) : bool
2 {
4 # l i n e s omitted f o r brev i ty . . .
6 l o c a l n = | d i s t i n c t p e e r s [ o r i g ] | ;
l o c a l p = or ig in d i s t i n c t p o r t s ? | d i s t i n c t p o r t s [ o r i g
] | ∗ 1 .0 : 1 . 0 ;
8 l o c a l pn = p / n ;
10 # Check f o r th re sho ld i f not outbound .
i f ( ! shut down thre sh reached [ o r i g ] &&
12 n >= shut down thresh &&
! outbound && or ig ! in S i t e : : n e ighbo r ne t s &&
14 (pn < po r t p e e r r a t i o t h r e s h l ow e r | | pn >
po r t p e e r r a t i o t h r e s h u pp e r ) )
{
16 shu t down th re sh reached [ o r i g ] = T;
l o c a l msg = fmt (”shutdown th resho ld reached f o r %s ” ,
o r i g ) ;
18 NOTICE( [ $note=ShutdownThresh , $ s rc=or ig ,
$ i d e n t i f i e r=fmt(”%s ” , o r i g ) ,
20 $p=se r v i c e , $msg=msg ] ) ;
}
22
# l i n e s omitted f o r b rev i ty . . .
24
}
Listing 12: check_scan alarm suppression for PPR
